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This paper summarizes findings from a decade-long project on forest degradation 
in the mid-Himalayan region of India and Nepal. The analysis is based on LSMS 
data  for  Nepal  and  field  work  in  Indian  states  of  Uttaranchal  and  Himachal 
Pradesh  comprising  sample  surveys  of  forests,  households  and  village 
communities, besides commissioned anthropological studies for select villages.  
The  purpose  was  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  deforestation  and 
degradation  from  ground-level  forest  measurements,  its  implications  for  living 
standards  of  local  communities,  the  contribution  of  different  factors  commonly 
alleged  such  as  local  poverty,  inequality,  economic  growth,  demographic 
changes,  property  rights  and  lack  of  collective  action  by  local  communities.  
Principal  findings,  policy  implications  and  questions  for  future  research  are 
discussed.    3 
Deforestation and forest degradation in the Himalayas are a major concern 
for social scientists and policy makers because of the large common property 
externalities involved at both the global and the local levels. At the global level, 
the Himalayan range is one of the most unstable and fragile mountain areas in 
the world (Ives and Messerly 1989). Deforestation speeds up global warming and 
tends  to  accentuate  the  disastrous  consequences  of  earthquakes,  and  is  a 
significant  contributing  factor  to  landslides  and  flooding.  This  has  a  serious 
impact  on  the  equilibrium  of  the  Ganges  and  Brahmaputra  river  basins,  and 
heightens the frequency of flooding in Bangladesh (Metz 1991). 
  At  a  more  local  level,  the  alpine  zone  of  the  Himalayas  is  home  to 
populations  who  rely  mainly  on  agriculture  and  livestock  rearing  for  their 
livelihood. Their livelihoods rely strongly on the forests adjoining their villages. 
Firewood,  timber,  fodder  and  leaf-litter  for  livestock  are  collected  from  these 
forests.  The  forests  are  also  used  for  grazing  livestock.  Environmental 
degradation reduces the amount of available resource and increases the time 
required for their collection. A number of studies have argued that these losses 
adversely affect the poor in a number of ways, e.g., health, nutrition and child 
education (Amacher et al  2001; Cooke 1998; Dasgupta 1995; Dasgupta and 
Mäler 1995; Kumar and Hotchkiss 1988).  
Other  concerns  include  the  likely  impact  of  economic  growth  in  poor 
countries on environmental resources (Arrow et al 1995; Dasgupta and Mäler 
1995, 2005; Dasgupta et al 2000).  As developing countries catch up with the rest 
of the world, what will be the impact on the world’s forests?    4 
Our  project  which  was  initiated  in  the  late  1990s  had  a  number  of 
objectives.  The  first  was  to  empirically  assess  the  extent  and  the  nature  of 
deforestation or forest degradation in the Himalayas, using ground-level forest 
ecology surveys. The second objective was to use this data along with detailed 
household surveys in areas adjoining the forests to empirically investigate the 
role of different underlying causes commonly alleged by academic researchers, 
policymakers and environmental groups. These include local poverty, inequality 
and  its  deleterious  effects  on  local  collective  action,  economic  growth  and 
commercialization pressures, demographic changes comprising rapid population 
growth,  household  fragmentation  and  migratory  patterns,  property  rights  over 
forests and ineffective management of state-owned forests.  We also sought to 
measure  effects  on  standards  of  living  of  rural  communities  living  near  the 
forests, identify suitable policy options and estimate their effectiveness.   
The  primary  hypotheses  concerning  factors  driving  environmental 
degradation in developing countries can be roughly classified as follows. At one 
extreme is the  Poverty-Environment Hypothesis, originally proposed by the 1987 
United Nations Brundtland Commission, asserting that poverty is the root cause 
of  environmental  problems,  as  degradation  arises  owing  to  exploitation  of 
common property resources particularly by the poor (Barbier 1997; Duraiappah 
1998; Jalal 1993; Lele 1991; Lopez 1998; Mäler 1998). According to this view, 
solutions to environmental problems require first and foremost reduction in local 
poverty, either via economic growth or other state-initiated anti-poverty programs. 
At  the  other  extreme  is  the  view  that  environmental  degradation  owes  to 
economic  growth  which  raises  the  demand  for  environmental  resources  in   5 
tandem with private goods (e.g., views expressed in the media, 2006 Summit 
Report of the World Economic Forum, or World Bank reports on deforestation in 
India).
2 An intermediate hypothesis referred to as the `Environmental Kuznets 
Curve’, is that economic growth may initially aggravate environmental problems 
in poor countries at early stages of development, but will eventually ease them 
once  the  level  of  per  capita  income  passes  a  threshold  (Barbier  1997b; 
Grossman and Krueger 1995; Yandle, Vijayaraghavan and Bhattarai 2002).  
Other viewpoints stress the importance of local institutions such as 
monitoring systems and community property rights (Baland and Platteau 1996; 
Bardhan 2005; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 1997; Dasgupta and Mäler 2004; 
Jodha 2001; Somanathan 1991; Varughese 2000). Some argue that 
deforestation in the past owed primarily to poor control and monitoring systems: 
once local communities are assigned control they will be successful in regulating 
environmental pressures, implying there is not much role for external state 
interventions.  And some argue that local collective action is  undermined by 
social and economic inequality within neighboring communities. 
These  hypotheses  present  different  perspectives  on  the  environmental 
consequences of development, and the role of policy. Yet there is remarkably 
little systematic micro-empirical evidence on their validity. Efforts to test these 
hypotheses  have  been  cast  mainly  on  the  basis  of  macro  cross-country 
regressions. There are only a handful of recent efforts to use micro-econometric 
evidence concerning behavior of households and local institutions governing use 
                                                 
2 See Economist magazine, `No Economic Fire Without Smoke’, July 8 2004, Books and 
Arts section; www.weforum.org/pdf/summitreports/am2006/emergence.htm, and World 
Bank (2000).    6 
of environmental resources (Chaudhuri and Pfaff 2003; Foster and Rosenzweig 
2003; Somanathan, Prabhakar and Mehta 2009).  
Accordingly we started by using household-level surveys (with World Bank 
Living Standards Surveys) in Nepal to address these questions. These household 
level  surveys  were  not  designed  to  address  detailed  questions  concerning 
deforestation. We therefore subsequently conducted surveys of forests, village 
communities  and  households  in  two  northern  Indian  states  in  the  same  mid-
Himalayan region between 2000-03. Anthropological surveys in six villages in the 
sample were also commissioned, in order to test and/or corroborate our empirical 
findings.  Resource  and  time  limitations  necessitated  our  relying  on  a  single 
cross-section  round  of  surveys,  with  limited  use  of  recall  data  to  estimate 
historical  patterns  of  deforestation.  This  imposes  inevitable  restrictions  on  the 
econometric analysis and the nature of reliable inferences that can be drawn. 
However  we  have  recently  had  the  opportunity  to  access  a  panel  dataset  for 
Nepal from the LSMS surveys in collaboration with Francois Libois, from which 
preliminary results indicate that the main results of the cross-section analyses 
continue to hold (Baland, Libois and Mookherjee 2011). 
This  paper  provides  an  overview  of  the  main  findings  so  far.  We  first 
describe in Section 1 what we learnt regarding pressure on the Indian Himalayan 
forests  on  the  basis  of  our  forest  ecology  surveys.  As  we  shall  see,  the  key 
problem appears to be forest degradation owing to firewood and fodder collected 
by  neighboring  households,  rather  than  deforestation.  Local  collective  action 
constraining  forest  use  is  conspicuous  by  its  absence,  implying  that  self-
interested behaviour of households drives firewood and fodder collection. Section   7 
2  thereafter  describes  our  findings  concerning  determinants  of  household 
firewood  collection  activities.  Section  3  focuses  on  community  property  rights, 
where  we  assess  the  performance  of  the  differing  regimes  of  property 
management in Uttaranchal. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  Degradation of the Himalayan Forests 
1.1 The India survey 
 
Our analysis is based on household, community and forest ecology surveys of 
a random sample of 165 villages divided equally between Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttaranchal, carried out by our field investigators between 2000-2003. On the 
basis of census data, villages were stratified on the basis of altitude, population 
and distance to the nearest town. Villages were then selected randomly within 
each  stratum.  A  random  sample  of  twenty  households  was  selected  in  each 
village,  on  the  basis  of  a  stratification  procedure  combining  landholding  and 
caste-distribution in the village. 
Three sets of questionnaires were used to conduct surveys in each village: 
(a)  a  household  questionnaire  administered  to  the  twenty  sample  households 
dealt with the socio-economic structure of the household and its dependence on 
forests; (b) a village questionnaire was designed to secure information on a host 
of village level characteristics such as demographic size, access to physical and 
social  infrastructure,  the  market  environment,  and  institutions  of  local 
governance;  (c)  an  ecology  questionnaire  intended  to  gather  quantitative  and 
qualitative evidence on the condition of the forest stock accessed by the villagers.    8 
The  forest  surveys  were  carried  out  by  trained  ecologists  who  first 
identified local forest zones accessed by each village in the sample, which were 
mapped  by  interacting  with  the  villagers.    Random  transects  (100  meters  in 
length) were laid in each forest area and measurements were recorded at three 
equidistant plots (of  5.63 meters radius) on the transect  to record the species 
composition, canopy cover , basal area,  heights and girths of  trees above 3 
meters in height as well as  regeneration characteristics. Qualitative assessment 
of grazing, lopping, leaf-litter accumulation, timber extraction and evidence on 
natural calamities such as fire and snowfall damage to trees was also recorded at 
each plot in terms of a predetermined qualitative scale. We collected detailed 
information  on  619  forests  by  taking  measures  in  3512  forest  plots  (as  the 
number of transects varied with the size of the forest). The second part of the 
ecology surveys interviewed 3 to 4 members of each village (chosen randomly 
within each village) with regard to their perceptions of changes in forest stock 
over the past quarter century and the nature of institutions governing access and 
use of the forest.  
In the context of Nepal we utilized only the World Bank Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys carried out in 1995-6 and 2002-3. While these surveys 
contain very little information on forests and village ecology, they have detailed 
information  at  the  household  level,  particularly  relative  to  household 
consumption,  income  and  firewood  collection.  We  will  also,  when  possible, 
compare the results for Nepal and India.  
 
   9 
 
1.2 Measuring Himalayan Forest Degradation 
 
The few quantitative studies available are based on satellite imagery and 
indicate substantial degradation of the Himalayan forest over the last decades. 
Prabhakar  et  al.  (2006)  estimate  that  61%
3  of  forests  in  two  districts  of 
Uttarankhand are severely deteriorated (with crown cover of under 40%). This 
observation  suggests  that  the  present  trend  differs  substantially  from  past 
developments, which were characterised more by deforestation, i.e. a decline of 
forest area. Myers (1986) calculates for example that, in Nepal between 1947 
and  1980,  forest  cover  of  national  territory  dropped  from  57%  to  23%.  By 
contrast,  Foster  and  Rosenzweig  (2003)  find  that,  for  India  as  a  whole,  the 
proportion of land covered by forests (measured on the basis of satellite images) 
has increased significantly over the past three decades.  
In our own survey, we used physical measurements taken directly in the 
forests,  rather  than  rely  on  aerial  satellite  images.  Our  view  is  that  important 
dimensions  of  forest  quality  can  only  be  assessed  by  ground-level  ecology 
studies. Various measures have been devised by forest ecologists for assessing 
the state of a forest. The conventional forest management indicators measure the 
available tree stock. These include canopy cover (the amount of ground area 
covered by the canopy through which direct light passes),
4 which measures the 
density of foliage, and basal area (the total area covered by the cross-sectional 
                                                 
3 The 90% confidence interval is equal to 48-73%. 
4 This is, in fact, a similar measure to the crown cover indicator used by Prabhakar et al. 
(2006), but as seen from ground level, rather than an aerial view.   10 
area of tree trunks per hectare), which measures the density of standing trees per 
hectare.  The  latter  measure  depends  on  tree-felling  for  timber  by  villagers. 
Another set of measures captures, for a given stock of trees, the quality and the 
state  of  the  standing  trees.  These  measures,  which  include  lopping  (the 
proportion of a tree trunk that has been lopped) reflect another type of pressure 
on  the  forests  coming  from  firewood  and  fodder  collections.  At  a  stationary 
equilibrium, these various measures should be correlated, with residual variations 
being explained by factors such as the type of soil, natural hazards, exposure to 
light or tree species. The problem however stems from the fact that, when fodder 
and firewood collections increase while timber felling remains constant, the basal 
area does not correctly reflect forest degradation, at least in the short run. The 
other measures are much more sensitive to these changes.
5  
Table  1  below  shows  the  mean  values  and  the  correlations  obtained 
between  these  variables.  We  have  also  included  the  firewood  collection  time, 
which measures one of the direct impacts of forest degradation on households. 
Here, collection time corresponds to total collection time, which includes the time 
it takes to walk to the forest.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
                                                 
5 In Baland et al (2010b), we also measured the volume of wood per hectare (basal 
volume), which is another conventional measure of biomass and regeneration capacity 
(number of saplings above a height of 0.5 metre per hectare), which declines in the case 
of illegal felling or frequent grazing. Further measures of biological diversity or quality 
of tree species could be included. However the main issue here is more the quantity of 
available wood, which explains our choice of the aforementioned measures.    11 
This  table  invites  three  comments.  First,  the  correlation  between  the  different 
measures is weak, which justifies paying attention to all three to evaluate the 
state of a forest. Secondly, there is little correlation between collection time and 
the  other  measures.  The  low  correlation  is  partly  explained  by  the  fact  that 
collection times are not a good measure of forest degradation within a village. 
Indeed, as villagers choose their collecting places on the basis of the time they 
expect  to  take,  collection  times  across  forests  within  a  village  should  be 
equalized, and would therefore be independent of the degree of degradation of a 
particular forest. Comparisons of collection time across forests adjoining a given 
village over time would be more informative of differences in degradation.  
Finally, the median value of canopy cover is very low while that of lopping 
is alarmingly high.  By comparison, the natural thresholds indicating a completely 
non-degraded  forest  have  been  estimated  around  80%  for  canopy  cover,  40 
m
2/ha for the basal area and 15% of tree height for lopping (Thadani 1999). We 
illustrate the distribution observed for each of these measures in Figures 1 to 3 
below. We also use a vertical broken straight line to show the level corresponding 
to a severely degraded state of the forest, corresponding to thresholds of 40% for 
canopy cover, two-thirds of tree height lopped, and 35 square metres per hectare 
for basal area (Thadani 1999). 
More than half of the forests evidence a severely degraded canopy cover 
(less than 40%) and the extent of lopping exceeds two-thirds of tree height. On 
the other hand, as shown in Figure 3, the tree biomass, measured by the basal 
area,  shows  significantly  less  deterioration.  This  means  that  most  of  the 
degradation is linked to excessive short-run exploitation, which is not yet visible   12 
in terms of a reduction in the volume of standing wood in the forest. In other 
words, even though the quantity of trees is satisfactory, they are in a particularly 
poor state: most of their branches have been lopped or torn off and their canopy 
density is much too low. The unhealthy quality of trees threatens their growth 
potential and their resistance to natural calamities (such as frost or drought). It  
drastically reduces the forest’s capacities for future biomass production.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 HERE 
 
The household surveys conducted confirm these trends. Over the last 25 
years, the average firewood collection time increased by 60% (from 2.36 to 3.84 
hours  per  firewood  bundle),  whereas  distance  to  the  forest  increased  by  only 
10% (from 2.06 to 2.31 kilometres). These differing trends suggest that the cause 
of increased collection time is not so much the conversion of forest areas into 
agricultural land or pastureland, as the degradation of forest quality.
6 More than 
80% of the village respondents said they felt that forest quality was in decline. 
Forest degradation rather than deforestation thus seems to characterise current 





                                                 
6 The household surveys show that the level of clearance for agricultural purposes is 
relatively negligible. Moreover, clearance mostly involves non-forested commons (60%). 
Clearance of forested areas only concerns 5% of cases.    13 
1.3 Proximate Causes of Himalayan Forest Degradation 
 
We thus set about examining the causes of this degradation. These can 
be natural, such as fire- or snowfall-related damage, or anthropogenic. Among 
the man-related causes, a distinction should be made between those linked to 
the use of firewood, fodder collection and grazing, and those relating to tree-
felling  for  commercial  purposes  or  to  timber  removal.  Table  2  illustrates  the 
relative importance of these causes in each of the forest plots visited.
7 Although 
all  the  measures  are  not  strictly  comparable,  anthropogenic  pressures, 
particularly  in  the  context  of  firewood  collection,  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
observed degradation.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
It is somewhat difficult to obtain reliable data on timber removal, chiefly because 
this activity is strictly controlled and commercial exploitation is mostly forbidden. 
This said, our household surveys show one tree equivalent of timber is used by a 
household  every  five  years  for  construction  purposes.  Assuming  an  average 
three-ton  weight  per  tree,  and  an  average  of  80  households  per  village,  this 
represents 48 tons of timber per year per village. This compares with a little over 
450 tons of firewood per year per village. In terms of biomass, timber removal for 
household usage accounts for scarcely 10% of the total mass of wood removed 
                                                 
7The size of each plot is equal to 100 m
2.   14 
from  the  forest.  Lopping  for  fodder  and  particularly  for  firewood  is  thus  the 
foremost cause of forest degradation. 
  
1.4 Forest Ownership and Use Rights 
 
All forests are classified as State forests; with exceptions noted below they are 
governed by the forest department. The department has a hierarchical 
administrative structure. The lowest rung is occupied by a forest guard who is 
responsible for monitoring use on a day to day basis. A legacy of the colonial 
past, the department manages and monitors vast expanses of forests under its 
control. The main motive behind the forest department’s operations is 
conservation, though some commercialization objectives also exist. For instance, 
while there is a ban on green felling, the forest department can sell timber 
acquired through salvaging operations where the forest stock has been damaged 
due to natural calamities or alternatively timber acquired through silviculture 
operations. In some pine forests, the department can extract and sell resin, an 
important ingredient in the manufacture of turpentine. 
 
Locals have `rights’ to access state forests for their livelihood needs. However, 
they have to abide by rules of extraction and use prescribed by the forest 
department. Violation of such rules is a legal offence. The forest guard is the 
main interface between the locals and higher authorities in the department, 
whose main role is to watch over the forest for detecting violations and imposing 
penalties on the accused. For historical reasons in the past, state forests have   15 
been classified into ‘un-demarcated’ and ‘demarcated’ patches. Un-demarcated 
forests known as ‘unclassed forests’ in Himachal and ‘civil soyam’ forests in 
Uttaranchal, are recorded as forests by the forest department but these are 
not marked by boundary pillars. The department cannot impose prohibitions on 
these patches as regards rights of access and use. In contrast, a demarcated 
forest is marked by boundary pillars, an area notified under the Indian 
Forest Act of 1927. Locals can access such forests unless restrictions are 
imposed by the forest department. When a forest is declared as a ‘sanctuary 
area’ all rights are completely denied. Demarcated forests are further categorized 
into ‘demarcated protected forests’  and ‘reserved forests’. As the name 
suggests, reserve forests are subject to the most stringent restrictions on use. 
  
However, the forest department faces many obstacles in enforcing these 
restrictions. Households revealed in the course of their survey responses the 
ineffectiveness of the forest guard in monitoring violations or imposing penalties. 
Our ecology surveys indicated no significant differences in degradation between 
demarcated and undemarcated forest patches, with regard to canopy cover, 
lopping and basal area. 
 
In Uttaranchal the management of some forests have been turned over to local 
Van Panchayats, or self-governing forest user groups. We discuss these further 
below. 
 
   16 
 
1.5 Local Collective Action Constraining Forest Use 
 
A  random  sample  of  four  local  inhabitants  in  each  village  was  asked  to 
provide oral histories of local forests on the basis of a structured questionnaire. A 
large  majority  of  them  (88%)  agreed  that  there  was  a  general  sense  in  their 
villages that the forest stock was shrinking. Yet only 45% reported that there was 
any alarm or concern regarding this in their communities. Only in a handful of 
cases did they report that concrete steps had been taken to arrest the process.
8 
This  was  corroborated  in  the  more  detailed  anthropological  studies  of  select 
villages.  
Consistent with the lack of spontaneous collective action to control firewood 
collections  within  these  villages,  cross-village  analyses  of  the  relationship 
between land inequality and firewood collections using the Nepal LSMS data for 
1995-96 failed to find any significant correlations, controlling for average holdings 
of  land  and  other  relevant  village  characteristics  (Baland  et  al  2007b).  As 
mentioned  earlier,  a  large  theoretical  literature  has  speculated  that  local 
inequality  may  be  an  important  determinant  of  effective  collective  action;  this 
consideration ceases to be relevant when collective action is absent. 
This raises the question of the reasons for failure of local communities to 
engage in some form of collective action. Could the failure to act collectively to 
                                                 
8 In a few villages in Uttaranchal some un-demarcated state forests were reported to have 
been closed for regeneration. Village inhabitants of Rogi village in Kinnaur district and 
Gojra in Kullu district of Himachal, closed some local forest patches due to severe threat 
of landslides that has damaged their fields in the past.    17 
arrest  the  deforestation  process  more  widely  reflect  lack  of  knowledge  of 
appropriate  forest  management  practices?  This  appears  unlikely  as  villagers 
seemed well aware of methods of ensuring sustainable forests prescribed by the 
forest  department  (collection  of  dry  wood,  rotational  methods  of  lopping),  but 
restricted their practice to their own private tree holdings and sacred groves in the 
village.  The  collective  failure  to  arrest  forest  degradation  could  neither  be 
explained  by  a  lack  of  capacity  for  local  collective  action  per  se.  We  found 
numerous  instances  of  collective  action  in  other  areas  relevant  to  current 
livelihoods, such as agriculture, water management and credit, besides women’s 
groups, youth groups, and temple committees. 
Spontaneous  collective  action  with  respect  to  forests  therefore  seems 
basically  absent.  In  many  villages,  however,  some  of  the  village  forest  is 
managed  by  a  formal  forest  committee  (Van  Panchayats,  eco-vikas,  forest 
management committees). These have been created and/or recognized by the 
government.  They  are  more  widespread  in  Uttaranchal  where  45  out  of  83 
villages  had  a  van  panchayat.  However,  the  actual  area  under  the  control  of 
these formal village committees remains limited: according to Sarkar (2008), Van 
Panchayat  forests  represent  11%  of  the  total  forest  area  in  Uttaranchal.  The 
experience of these committees is described as mixed, with some committees 
functioning effectively and succeeding in protecting the part of the forest under 
their command. We provide a more systematic analysis of their effectiveness in 
controlling firewood collections in section 3 below.    18 
 
2. Analyzing Household Demand for Firewood 
2.1 Modelling Household Choices 
 
At the beginning of this project we thought that understanding patterns of 
collective action would be important, and how it interacts with the state of the 
common property resource as well as with a number of village characteristics, 
such  as  leadership  and  inequality.  But  with  the  community  surveys  and 
anthropological  evidence  indicating  virtual  absence  of  spontaneous  collective 
action, as well as extremely weak control over firewood use in state forests, it 
became evident that we needed to model household collections as resulting from 
self-interested household choices, unconstrained by social norms or penalties for 
collections. The only relevant costs of collecting firewood and fodder were the 
opportunity costs of the time spent in these activities. Hence our analytical efforts 
shifted  from  modelling  collective  action  in  villages  to  private  household 
production-cum-consumption  models  where  production,  energy  and  household 
consumption activities are jointly determined. 
The household surveys showed that firewood continues to be the main 
source of household energy in the Himalayas. In the zone under study, firewood 
is used for cooking energy in summer by 90% of households, and gas by 9%. For 
cooking and heating in winter, firewood is used by 99% of households (Baland et 
al  2007a).  In  Nepal,  according  to  1995-6  LSMS,  villages  use  firewood  as  the 
prime source of energy, when it is available: 82% of households in 1995-6 and   19 
75% in 2002-3. The second source of energy used was gas (in 2002-3) (Baland 
et al 2010a).  
In  most  villages  there  are  no  markets  for  firewood  at  the  village  level, 
though  some  marginal  amounts  are  commercialized  at  the  nearby  market 
centres. This implies that, for a typical villager, the collection and the production 
of firewood cannot be separated. Going back to our initial question as to what 
extent income growth is related to forest degradation in this region, there are two 
effects at play. The first is the wealth effect, wherein increasing wealth increases 
consumption of goods and energy, assuming their relative costs are unchanged. 
The wealth effect can however be negative for firewood if it is an inferior good, 
e.g.,  if  it  is  associated  with  less  social  prestige  or  if  the  household  seeks  to 
reduce  its  exposure  to  pollution  by  switching  to  alternate  cleaner  but  more 
expensive fuels. Hence the direction of the wealth effect in the case of firewood is 
not clear a priori.  The second is the cost effect: insofar as firewood is mainly 
collected by households, wealthier households have a higher opportunity cost of 
time spent collecting it, which makes the firewood more expensive. Our surveys 
indicated  negligible  use  of  purchased  firewood,  hired  labor  or  technology  to 
substitute  for  family  labor  in  collection  of  firewood.  Hence  the  cost  channel 
implies that increasing wealth and income will reduce the demand for firewood. 
The  net  effect  is  therefore  ambiguous,  if  firewood  is  a  normal  good,  with  the 
wealth and cost effects operating in opposite directions. If it is an inferior good, 
then both effects would cause firewood consumption to decline in wealth. Hence 
empirical  work  is  needed  to  discover  the  effect  of  rising  wealths  on  firewood 
collection, and disentangle the wealth and cost effects.   20 
This  task  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  conventional  tools  of  demand 
analysis  that  assume  exogeneity  of  income,  consumption  and  prices  are 
inapplicable.  Hence  the  economic  cost  of  firewood  cannot  be  separated  from 
other household characteristics, incomes or consumption. In most of the existing 
literature, there are no attempts to estimate wealth and cost effects associated 
with increases in income (or the underlying productive assets). Given the lack of 
longitudinal  data  (except  in  our  most  recent  work  on  this  topic),  we  examine 
cross-sectional  variations  in  household  firewood  collections  with  ownership  of 
different  assets.  In  so  doing  we  confronted  a  number  of  formidable 
methodological problems associated with endogeneity of income, measurement 
error, omitted variables and endogenous censoring, which we now discuss. 
The most important problem is endogeneity of income or consumption, the 
most commonly used measures of household living standards. There are many 
possible unobserved household traits that affect both consumption and firewood 
collection that could bias estimated Engel elasticities. In addition, both income 
and consumption are prone to significant measurement errors, especially in a 
rural society dominated by farming and livestock related occupations. Reliable 
instruments for income and consumption that do not affect firewood collections 
are  rarely  available.  We  proceed  on  the  premise  that  endogeneity  and 
measurement  error  problems  are  less  acute  for  underlying  household  assets 
(land,  livestock,  household  size,  education  etc.)  than  income  or  consumption. 
Based on a model of household decision-making concerning labor supply, fuel 
choice and consumption for a given composition of assets owned, we develop 
two  estimation  strategies.  The  first  (called  the  semi-structural  form  (SS)   21 
approach) aggregates stocks of different assets into a single scalar measure of 
wealth  (called  ‘potential  income’).  For  this  purpose  we  estimate  a  household 
production  function,  following  the  approach  of  Jacoby  (1993)  to  overcome 
problems with endogeneity of labor supply. Apart from allowing us to estimate 
household potential income as the measure of wealth, this yields an estimate of 
household shadow wages which can be used to value the opportunity cost of 
time spent collecting firewood. At the second step these are used as measures of 
household wealth to estimate the wealth effects, while cost effects are estimated 
using  interactions  of  these  estimated  shadow  wages  with  reported  firewood 
collection times. Firewood consumption is regressed both on potential income 
and the interactions of shadow wage with collection time, so that controlling for 
the other the regression coefficient of these variables can be interpreted as the 
wealth and cost effects respectively.
9 
The second estimation strategy (which we refer to as the reduced form 
(RF)  approach)  relates  firewood  collection  directly  to  the  entire  vector  of 
household assets, and their interaction with collection times. While the results of 
this approach are more complex and harder to interpret than the SS results, they 
are more reliable owing to avoidance of errors in estimating potential income and 
shadow wages. Moreover, it avoids the assumption implicit in the aggregation 
procedure underlying the SS approach that the wealth effects of each asset are 
proportional to their respective effects on household income. Wealth effects could 
                                                 
9 To elaborate further, the estimated coefficient with respect to wealth can be interpreted as the effect of 
increasing wealth of the household in a context where collection times are negligible, as the cost effect 
would then not come into play. Conversely, the regression coefficient of the interaction of the shadow wage 
and collection time indicates the effect of rising collection time and how it differentially affects households 
with varying shadow wages, controlling for their respective wealth levels.   22 
differ  from  income  effects  in  a  heterogenous  fashion  if  different  assets  are 
associated with distinct occupations, locations of work, or networks of coworkers, 
which  affect  awareness  of  household  members  concerning  health  effects  of 
firewood vis-a-vis alternate fuels, or accessibility to the latter.  
Other econometric problems pertain to omitted variables and endogenous 
censoring. Geography or climate variations may jointly affect firewood availability, 
asset  ownership  and  living  standards.  We  control  for  such  village-specific 
characteristics  with  village  fixed  effects,  effectively  focusing  on  intra-village 
variations of firewood collections with household wealth. This also controls for 
factors such as inequality or social norms that have been argued to be important 
determinants  of  common  property  resources  use.  In  addition  we  control  for 
various  other  household  characteristics  available  in  the  LSMS  data,  such  as 
household demographics. In the context of Nepal we see a sizeable fraction of 
households  not  using  firewood  at  all,  so  the  estimation  procedure  has  to 
incorporate endogenous censoring. Similar problems arise in the Indian context 
in  studying  the  role  of  variations  in  the  cost  of  LPG  gas,  since  only  a  small 
fraction of households use LPG gas. 
Problems that we cannot address owing to the nature of the data include 
the  following.  The  amount  of  firewood  collected  is  measured  in  terms  of  the 
number of ‘bharis’ or headloads that the household report collecting. As the size 
of  a  headload  varies  across  individuals,  this  introduces  a  potential  bias.  It  is 
possible that richer households are better fed and tend to carry larger bharis, 
resulting in an underestimate of the impact of living standards on actual firewood 
collection.  Additionally,  households  confronted  with  longer  walking  times  carry   23 
lighter  or  smaller  headloads.  The  impact  of  collection  time  on  the  amount  of 
firewood taken may thus be under-estimated. Collection time is also based on 
individual reporting by the household, and may vary with various characteristics. 
To partially address this problem, we compute the average of individual collection 
times at the village level, and use the latter as a more  `objective’ measure of 
collection time. The other advantage of this is that this measure can also be used 
for  villagers  that  do  not  collect  firewood.  This  procedure  is  valid  as  long  as 
villages are not too dispersed so that all villagers face the same distance to the 
forests.  
Yet other shortcomings of our approach arise from our assumption that all 
household members are identical with regard to their skills and are thus perfect 
substitutes in production. In particular, it implies that all members face the same 
shadow  wage  in  collecting  firewood,  and  share  collection  tasks  equally.  This 
ignores  the  possibility  of  specialization  of  tasks  within  the  household,  with 
resulting disparities in shadow wages across different members. 
The hypotheses discussed in the Introduction are all based on a specific 
assumption as to the predominance that one of the effects has over the other. For 
example, the environmental Kuznets curve can be interpreted as the claim that 
the wealth effect is positive and dominates the cost effect at low levels of income, 
while at higher incomes the wealth effect becomes smaller relative to the cost 
effect, and may even turn negative. Unfortunately, rigorous studies separating out 
wealth and cost effects are few and far between: many studies suffer from major   24 
methodological  weaknesses,  owing  to  their  neglect  of  the  issues  discussed 
above.
10 
  Among the methodologically rigorous studies, Chaudhury and Pfaff (2003) 
use a large sample of households in Pakistan to evidence a clear transition from 
traditional to modern fuels as per capita income rises. It is important to note that 
they find this transition happening mainly in urban areas, where substitutes to 
firewood are more readily available. Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) find a small 
(but statistically significant) negative relationship between firewood consumption 
and income in a large household sample of rural households in India. However, 
the Himalayan village context is different from the all-India context, mainly due to 
the  easy  access  to  firewood,  higher  levels  of  poverty  and  lack  of  access  to 
alternate energy sources.  
 
2.2  Firewood Engel Curves  
 
  We  start  by  describing  the  relationship  between  income  and  firewood 
consumption in Nepal and the Indian Himalayas (Baland et al. 2007a, 2010a
11) 
using simple Engel curves. These show the relationship between the amount of 
firewood  collected  by  the  household  compared  to  the  village  average  (in  the 
number of standard deviations), and household income compared to the village 
average  (in  the  number  of  standard  deviations,  income  being  measured  by 
consumption  expenditures).  In  this  way,  we  actually  compare  the  amount  of 
                                                 
10 A detailed literature review is provided in Baland et al. (2010a). 
11 We use collection and consumption interchangeably, given the virtual absence of firewood markets.  
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firewood  collected  by  different  households  within  the  same  village  (i.e.,  by 
comparing with the village average) non-parametrically, with no other  controls. 
Figure 4 represents the Engel curve obtained for Nepal in 1995-6  and 2002-3, 
Figure 5 the curve obtained for the Indian Himalayan villages.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE 
 
The Engel curves show an essentially increasing relationship between firewood 
collection and household income. In the Nepalese villages, this relationship is 
concave, with the wealthiest households showing a turning point in the tail of the 
distribution (above the 95 percentile). On average, a 10% increase in income is 
associated with a 4% rise in firewood collection. The income effect thus seems to 
be largely positive and dominates the substitution effect. The results are very 
similar for India. It should be noted that the concavity of the Engel curves could 
imply, all other things being equal, that villages in which income disparities are 
lower  consume  more  wood.  The  concavity  measure  in  the  present  instance 
remains relatively weak, which means that this effect is probably not of great 
importance.  This  is  corroborated  by  lack  of  direct  evidence  of  any  significant 
effect of local land inequality on household firewood collection, in a paper which 
estimated  village  fixed  effects  at  the  first  step  and  then  examined  how  the 
estimated village effects varied with measures of inequality (Baland et al 2007b). 
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2.3  Reduced  Form  and  Semi-Structural  Approaches  to  Estimating 
Household Demand for Firewood 
 
  Households  maximize  utility  by  choosing  firewood,  leisure  and 
consumption expenditures subject to a time budget constraint. Productive assets, 
demographics and the time taken to collect firewood are taken as given. This 
maximization yields the household demand for firewood as a function of income 
(or some measure of wealth), collection cost (the product of shadow wage and 
collection time) and household size.
12 We thus have:  
(1) Fi = f(Wi, wi.tci, ni) 
where  Fi  represents  the  amount  of  firewood  collected  and  consumed,  Wi a  
measure of income or wealth, tci the time spent collecting one unit of firewood, wi 
the shadow wage and ni, the labor stock in the family, or family size. It is natural 
to  suppose  that  collection  time  depends  on  occupational  patterns,  which 
themselves depend on the composition of assets owned. We therefore assume:  
(2) tci = t(g+SgiAi) 
where  t  represents  collection  time  in  the  village,  and  Ai  represent  the  assets 
operated by household i. Linearizing by a first-order Taylor approximation, we 
obtain:  
(3) Fi = a1Wi+ a2 wi*t(g+SgiAi) + a3 ni. 
This expression represents the basic regression equation estimated in our semi-
structural  (SS)  approach,  controlling  for  village  fixed  effects  and  endogenous 
                                                 
12 It is relatively immediate to also include the price of the closest substitute source of 
energy, such as gas (Baland et al 2010a).   27 
censoring.  As  explained  above,  the  coefficient  a1  is  a  measure  of  the  wealth 
effect while a2 is a measure of the cost effect.  
The critical problem here is how to measure wealth and the shadow wage. 
One  possibility  is  to  directly  use  the  level  of  consumption  expenditures  as  a 
measure  of  wealth  and  as  a  proxy  of  the  shadow  wage.  However,  both  are 
endogenously  determined.  Omitted  household  characteristics  such  as 
industriousness,  location  or  illness  could  simultaneously  affect  consumption, 
shadow  wages  and  firewood  collections,  resulting  in  biased  estimates. 
Measurement error in consumption compounds this problem. 
To  address  these,  an  alternative  strategy  is  to  use  an  asset-based 
measure  of  household  wealth,  under  the  assumption  that  most  assets  are 
inherited and less subject to endogeneity and measurement error. So we develop 
a  wealth  measure  called  potential  income,  defined  as  the  self-employment 
income that the household is expected to earn from its assets if it were to fully 
utilize  its  labor  stock.  We  therefore  estimate  in  a  first  step  a  Cobb-Douglas 
production function in which the household income is predicted by its productive 
assets and the number of labor hours worked. Since labor choices are potentially 
endogenous, we instrument labor hours by household size (the number of adults 
available for self-employment), a method used earlier by Jacoby (1993).
13 We 
then use the estimated elasticities of the household production function from the 
first stage to estimate its potential income, by calculating the income it would 
have earned if the entire labor stock in the household were fully utilized. We can 
                                                 
13 This strategy ignores the possibility that more productive households might attract relatives to join the 
household. Moreover, the exclusion restriction rules out the possibility that controlling for total hours 
employed, a larger household may be more productive, by taking better advantage of the division of labor 
or complementarity of skills across members.   28 
also  estimate  the  shadow  wage  of  the  household  by  estimating  the  marginal 
product  of  labor  hours  from  the  production  function.  As  it  turns  out,  potential 
income per head is highly correlated with estimated shadow wages, reflecting 
underlying variations in asset ownership. At the second step, we then estimate 
equation (3) using potential income as a proxy for wealth Wi  and either potential 
income or shadow wages as a proxy for wi.  
However, this method of using estimated production function parameters 
inevitably creates some errors of measurement in potential income and shadow 
wages,  with  attendant  attenuation  biases.  They  may  also  involve  aggregation 
biases  if  the  assumption  underlying  the  aggregation  (that  the  wealth  effect 
generated by different assets should be proportional to their respective effects on 
income)  is  not  valid.  These  problems  can  be  avoided  in  the  reduced  form 
approach,  which  relates  consumption  and  shadow  wages  directly  back  to 
household  characteristics.  Wealth  is  a  function  of  household  assets  (which 
includes household labor stock). The shadow wage is a function of household 
assets and collection costs. Combining these, we obtain the (RF) specification in 
which  F  is  expressed  as  a  function  of  household  assets,  household  size  and 
collection time interacted with household assets (since the collection cost is the 
product of collection time with the shadow wage in the household). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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The results of these various strategies are given in Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Table 3 gives the results of the semi-structural approach in the context of the 
Nepal 1995-96 LSMS data. The results presented in Table 3 separate the effect 
of  rising  assets  into  wealth  and  cost-of-collection  effects.  Estimated  wealth 
effects are statistically insignificant at the 10% level when potential income is 
used as the measure of wealth. However, they are significant when consumption 
and income are used instead. Cost-of-collection effects do not differ much across 
different  measures  of  wealth.  Rising  collection  time  itself  (interacted  with  the 
shadow wage) has a significant negative effect. The computation of the elasticity 
of firewood consumption to collection time cannot be directly estimated, as we 
have to take into account the interaction terms with the household productive 
assets. We discuss this further below.  
   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
We  also  estimated  firewood  collection  in  India  using  a  similar  semi-structural 
approach. The estimated elasticities for an average household are given in the 
Table 4. It shows that in the Indian sample firewood use is inelastic with respect 
to income growth, irrespective of whether it arises from productivity increases or 
asset  accumulation.  For  the  average  household,  firewood  use  per  capita  falls 
0.06%  following  an  increase  in  potential  income  of  10%.    The  elasticity  with 
respect  to  growth  of  any  asset  is  uniformly  below  0.02  in  absolute  value. 
Compared to our estimates for Nepal, the estimates for the Indian Himalayan   30 
region  using  the  potential  income  approach  yields  substantially  smaller 
elasticities.   
  We also estimated firewood collection using the reduced form approach 
for Nepal in 1995-6 and 2002-3. Table 5 shows the results, which distinguish 
between the wealth and cost effect of changes in various assets.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The  reduced  form  elasticities  are  generally  statistically  significant,  though  of 
smaller magnitude than indicated by the estimates in Table 3 based on the semi-
structural form using potential income. The improved statistical significance may 
owe to the reduction in measurement error associated with using assets directly 
rather  than  potential  income.  The  results  also  indicate  substantial  mis-
specification in the semi-structural form: e.g., disparate productive assets do not 
have  a  homogenous  impact  on  firewood  collection.  For  example,  livestock 
ownership is associated with a positive cost effect, indicating complementarity 
between livestock-rearing activities and firewood collection. On the other hand, 
land, education and non-farm business assets to some extent are associated with 
negative cost effects. The wealth effects of different assets are not proportional to 
their effects on potential income in the first stage regression in the semi-structural 
approach, as would be required for the latter approach to be valid. 
The reduced form estimates are therefore more reliable. The failure of the 
SS approach has some constructive implications, however. It indicates that the 
future impact of economic growth for the forest in Nepal crucially depends on the   31 
type of asset underpinning this growth. Growth based on modern assets, such as 
education  and  non-farm  business  assets,  reduces  firewood  collection  (on  the 
basis of 2002-3 estimates), with a total net elasticity of -0.06: if these two assets 
were to double, the demand for firewood is expected to decline by around 6%. On 
the other hand, growth associated with doubling of land and livestock is expected 
to lead to increased collection of firewood by 37%.  
  Moreover, total elasticity of firewood collection, the sum of the elasticities 
of all the assets, is relatively high: 0.89 in 1995-6 and 0.31 in 2002-3. An overall 
growth of all the assets, which leads to an equivalent growth in household income 
(economies  of  scale  proved  constant  in  our  estimates),  is  thus  expected  to 
produce  a  significant  increase  in  the  demand  for  firewood.  The  Engel  curves 
presented in Figure 4 already illustrated this phenomenon.  
  These results for Nepal indicate the need to estimate firewood demand in 
India using the reduced form approach rather than the semi-structural approach. 
This still remains to be done.  
To summarize we do not find any evidence from within-village variations 
in  support  of  the  Poverty  Environment  Hypothesis.  If  anything,  we  find  some 
evidence for the Environmental Kuznets curve in Nepal, whether one relies on 
the pure wealth effect or its combined effect including the induced changes in 
collection costs. But the upward rising portion of the Kuznets curve prevails for 
over 90% of the distribution, with some flattening and decline at the very top end. 
The  impact  of  wealth  or  income  increases  on  firewood  collection  is  either 
negligible (as in our SS estimates for India) or positive (as in the RF estimates for 
Nepal), except at the very top end of the respective distributions.    32 
Finally,  consider  the  implications  of  the  preceding  results  for  effects  of 
demographic  changes,  consisting  of  population  growth  and  changes  in 
household size and composition. The average household size in both India and 
Nepal indicates that most families are nuclear already and there is little scope for 
further fragmentation of households. Within villages we also find little variation in 
household size with per capita potential income. So it is reasonable to assume 
that household size will remain fixed in the near future, irrespective of economic 
growth. This implies that population growth will consist mainly of an increase in 
the  number  of  households.  Unless  there  is  substantial  out-migration  from 
villages, it is reasonable to suppose that population will grow by at least 10% in 
the next decade. Since our estimates pertained to demand per household, a 10% 
increase in the number of households in the village would give rise to a 10% rise 
in total firewood and fodder collections from the neighboring forests. This is a 
sizeable effect, comparable to the effect of doubling of non-farm business assets 
in Nepal, and bigger than the effect of doubling of education and non-farm assets 
with land and livestock remaining unchanged (as implied by the elasticities in 
Table 5). Demographic changes may thus be just important as economic growth 
in  determining  the  rate  of  forest  degradation  over  time.  Absent  significant 
increases  in  migration  out  of  these  villages,  the  pressure  on  forests  may  be 
expected to rise approximately in proportion to the rise in population.  Hence 
calculated benefits of policies that reduce fertility rates and encourage migration 
out of these rural communities should include their effects on forest degradation.  
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2.4  Local  Impact  of  Forest  Degradation:  Estimating  the  Local 
Externality 
 
Continued forest degradation will impact the lives of neighboring villagers 
primarily by raising the time it takes them to collect firewood and fodder. If trees 
are more severely lopped, the villagers will take longer to collect a single bundle, 
either by searching longer for trees that still have branches that can be lopped, or 
walking further into the forest parts that have not yet been harvested. This is the 
principal source of the local externality: higher collections today by any single 
household will raise collection times for all households in surrounding villages in 
the future.   
Precise  quantification  of  the  magnitude  of  this  local  externality  requires 
knowledge of the rate at which future collection times will rise in response to 
current collection levels. We have not attempted to estimate this so far. Instead 
we  will  try  to  provide  some  bounds  for  the  magnitude  of  the  externality  by 
considering the effects of an increase in collection time by one hour per bundle.  
The effect of a small increase in collection time on household welfare can 
be approximated by calculating the shadow cost of additional time required to 
collect the same number of bundles of firewood selected by the household prior 
to  the  increase  in  collection  time.  We  therefore  compute  the  shadow  wage 
corresponding to the rise in time required to collect the same amount of firewood 
over a year. In the case of Nepal in 1995-6, a one-hour increase in the time 
required to collect on bundle of wood corresponds to an estimated loss of income   34 
of  around  2%.
14  In  the  case  of  India,  this  figure  is  slightly  lower,  standing  at 
around 1%. The direct impact of the local externality on the villagers’ welfare is 
thus weak, which is certainly part of the factors explaining the lack of collective 
action at the local level. 
Assessments of future degradation would require estimates of the extent 
to  which  increased  collection  times  resulting  from  current  degradation  would 
induce  a  reduction  in  firewood  collections.  This  requires  an  estimate  of t h e  
elasticity of firewood consumption to collection time. The regression specification 
using  village  fixed  effects  makes  this  difficult,  as  collection  times  are  partially 
absorbed  by  the  village  fixed  effect.  We  estimated  only  the  extent  to  which 
differences in asset ownership interact with collection time at the village level to 
affect  firewood  collections.  Better  data  on  variations  in  collection  time  across 
households  within  the  same  village  would  be  needed  to  estimate  the  overall 
effect of increased collection time, and thus assess the extent to which current 
degradation  patterns  would  generate  a  self-correcting  tendency  for  household 
collections to decrease in the future. 
 
2.5 Household Substitution Between Alternate Energy Sources 
 
To  the  extent  that  policy  interventions  are  deemed  desirable  to  limit  firewood 
collections, it is natural for economists to think of corrective taxes and subsidies. 
                                                 
14 The data we use is an average firewood collection of 79 bundles per household per 
year, a median shadow wage of Rs 6.4 per hour, and median consumption expenditure of 
Rs 30 675.5 per year. The total time spent collecting firewood in Nepal in 1995-6 
represented around 400 hours per household per year.   35 
Since monitoring firewood collection by the government does not appear to be 
feasible  option,  a  natural  alternative  policy  instrument  would  be  subsidies  on 
alternate energy sources. We studied this question in the case of India in Baland 
et  al.  (2007a).
15  The  most  commonly  found  substitute  fuel  is  gas  in  cylinders 
(LPG). In the villages where this is available, the elasticity of firewood collection 
with respect to the price of gas is fairly high. Given an average price of Rs 300 
per cylinder, the estimated impact of a Rs 100 subsidy on household firewood 
collection is reported in Table 6. As might be expected, the reduction in firewood 
consumption  is  larger  during  the  summer  than  in  winter  (27%  and  19% 
respectively), averaging to a 22% decrease in annual consumption. The effects 
are substantial at all income levels: even amongst the poorest households (in the 
first quartile of the income distribution), demand for firewood drops by 19%. Our 
estimates imply a Rs 200 subsidy would reduce firewood consumption by 40%.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Our household level estimates also enable us to estimate the fiscal cost of 
subsidies. As we show in Baland et al. (2007a), this subsidy encourages 37% of 
the households to use an average 1.07 cylinders per person, which represents a 
subsidy of Rs 107 per using household. With an average per capita consumption 
expenditure of Rs 8646 per year, this corresponds to around 1.2% of their total 
consumption  expenditure.  For  the  overall  consumption  expenditures  of  all  the 
                                                 
15 It was more difficult to design a similar approach for Nepal where the use of gas in 
1995-6 was much less common. The 2002-3 data has yet to be analysed.   36 
villagers, this subsidy corresponds to an annual tax of 0.4%. At a relatively low 
cost, this policy can thus lead to a significant decrease in firewood consumption, 
particularly during the summer months.  
 
3. Decentralization, Community Management and Forest Quality 
3.1 Decentralization Movements in India and Nepal 
 
For several years, policies have been adopted in both Nepal and India to transfer 
part  of  the  rights  relating  to  State  forest  management  and  use  to  local 
communities. This policy approach is grounded in the idea that degradation of 
common property resources result from an inadequate institutional framework, 
which does not provide rural households with suitable incentives for rational and 
sustainable  resource  management.  While  it  is  true  that  centralised  State 
management,  which  often  focuses  on  regulating  resources,  yields  mitigated 
results in terms of environmental management (Ostrom 1990), the performance 
of decentralization policies concerning natural resources management by user 
communities  has  been  called  into  question  by  many  authors  (Baland  and 
Platteau  1996).  Whereas  local  user  organizations  are  often  able  to  develop 
complex  mechanisms  for  allocating  and  distributing  products  from  these 
resources, they often seem to be inadequate when it comes to setting up systems 
to protect such resources. This is particularly true when market expansion and 
population pressures come into play. Certain authors also criticise the idealised 
image of village “communities” put forward by some literature, drawing on case 
studies.  They  lay  greater  emphasis  on  the  shortcomings  of  community   37 
participation  programmes,  underlining  phenomena  such  as  capture  by  village 
elites,  the  absence  of  accountability  and  monitoring  procedures  or  insufficient 
knowledge and preparation of users (Abraham and Platteau 2001; Mansuri and 
Rao  2004).  In  the  context  of  Himalayan  forests,  an  important  question  thus 
concerns  the  relative  effectiveness  of  local  community  management  vis-à-vis 
centralised State management.  
In Nepal, a large-scale programme for forest resources management was 
launched in 1993. The programme’s objective is to transfer the management of 
all accessible forests to local communities, via Forest User Groups (FUGs). This 
includes controls on access to the forests, the right to tax forest products, hire 
forest guards and launch plantation programmes. Incomes generated by forest-
related activities can be used by these groups to finance local projects (such as 
roads, schools and temples).
16 This programme expanded very swiftly and it was 
estimated that 38% of the population was involved in an FUG by January 2007, 
In India, local forest management structures (known as Van Panchayats) 
were  first  created  in  1931,  primarily  in  Uttaranchal  by  the  colonial  British 
government  in  order  to  guarantee  local  communities  the  exclusive  use  of 
demarcated forest areas. This policy was vigorously pursued after independence, 
and  by  1998,  more  than  one  third  of  the  region’s  villages  had  their  own  Van 
Panchayat. An estimated 10% of existing forests are now under Van Panchayat 
control. Currently, three types of common property management regimes co-exist 
in Uttaranchal. State forests (Reserve Forest and Demarcated Protected Forests) 
                                                 
16 Certain legal restrictions are set for the use of these funds. For example, 25% of 
revenue must be reinvested in work aimed at developing the forest.    38 
are forests protected and managed by the State. Access and use of these forests 
are  subject  to  many  restrictions,  the  Forest  Department  being  responsible  for 
their  enforcement.  Open  access  forests  (Civil  Soyam)  are  forest  patches  with 
unrestricted  rights  of  access  (except  that  tree-felling  for  commercial  purposes 
remains  prohibited).  They  correspond  to  open  access  commons.  Finally,  the 
forests managed by the Van Panchayats are clearly demarcated forest patches, 
the use and exploitation (including plantation programmes) of which are defined 
by the local Van Panchayat, sometimes with State support.  
Since 2001, there has been a dramatic increase of Van Panchayats, as 
shown in Table 7. Under pressure from the Indian government, the number of 
Van Panchayats has almost doubled in five years. New rules were introduced to 
make it easier to create Van Panchayats (for example, approval by only 1/5 of the 
population is now required to create a Van Panchayat, instead of the previous 
1/3).  The  programme  includes  various  infrastructure  and  plantation  projects, 
which are a source of employment for the villagers.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Some observers, however, have pointed to the villagers’ lack of interest in these 
recently created community-managed forests, once the casual jobs related to the 
plantation and infrastructure work disappear. Some of the new Van Panchayats 
no longer meet and, in fact, only exist on paper (Sarkar 2008). This situation 
seems to differ from that of the Van Panchayats that were set up much earlier, 
which involved greater mobilisation and active involvement of  local communities.    39 
 
3.2 The Impact of Decentralization Policies in India and Nepal 
 
Most existing surveys (Somanathan 1991) that compare state-managed 
forests  with  those  managed  by  local  communities  underline  the  relative 
effectiveness of the latter but also the great disparities in their functioning and 
performance. These studies have three major shortcomings. Firstly, they often 
only  cover  very  narrow  geographical  areas  (Ostrom  1990;  Somanathan  1991; 
Gibson, McKean and Ostrom 2000; Jodha 2001; Varughese and Ostrom 2001; 
Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002). Moreover, they often base their evaluations on how 
the  management  councils  operate  (existence  of  regulations,  penalties,  forest 
guards…)  or  how  the  villagers  perceive  the  state  of  the  forests,  rather  than 
objective  indicators  of  forest  quality.  Finally,  they  typically  do  not  take  into 
account problems of selection: a Van Panchayat is formed by villagers’ decisions, 
which  gives  rise  to  a  potentially  significant  selection  bias.  For  example,  it  is 
possible that villages facing a more deteriorated forest environment have more to 
gain by creating active Van Panchayats to protect their forests. If forest quality is 
compared across villages with and without Van Panchayats, a positive correlation 
would  be  observed  between  the  existence  of  a  Van  Panchayat  and  forest 
degradation.  
The  studies  discussed  below  attempt  to  get  around  these  problems.  In 
Baland et al. (2010b), we compare different types of forest areas accessed by the 
same village. Somanathan et al. (2009) compare adjoining forests of different 
status. Edmonds (2002) compares villages where a community-managed forest   40 
is about to be created with villages in which this type of forest has just been 
created.  
Edmonds (2002) followed the implementation of an FUG programme in 
Nepal. He uses the fact that these groups are gradually set up to compare those 
villages where the programme was already in place in 1995-96 with the villages 
where  it  had  not  yet  been  implemented,  in  a  region  with  relatively  similar 
ecological  conditions.  After  controlling  for  a  large  number  of  household  and 
village variables, he finds that setting up an FUG causes a 10 to 15% reduction in 
the amount of firewood collected by neighboring households. This estimate is 
robust to a set of alternative methods and controls. This suggests the programme 
had a moderating effect on the quantities of firewood used.
17 Tree plantation and 
timber sales are also a key part of the programme, but a rigorous evaluation of 
this component is not yet available.
18 
  Somanathan et al. (2009) evaluate forest quality using data from satellite 
images  in  two  regions  of  Uttaranchal.  They  compare  crown  cover  of  forests 
across three types of forest management regimes: Van Panchayat forest, open 
access forest (unregulated), and State forest. They show that on average the 
crown cover of Van Panchayat forests is significantly higher than open access 
forests (12% for broad-leafed forests), and similar to State-managed forests. This 
is all the more remarkable as the Van Panchayats do not have the same rights as 
the Forest Department, especially as far as timber sales are concerned. In their 
                                                 
17 This is the case, even though the observations were made only three years after the 
formation of the FUGs. It is therefore likely that the long-run effects are greater. 
18 According to a recent estimate, sale of wood could represent on average two-thirds of 
overall revenue generated by the FUGs in Nepal (Pokharel 2008).   41 
comparisons, the authors take important factors into account such as population 
density, closeness to the villages and the geographical attributes of the forests, 
State forests having a better aspect and being further from the villages than the 
other types of forest. The authors compare these results with forest management 
costs: the costs of State management are 13 times higher per hectare of forest 
than those for Van Panchayat management.
19  
  In Uttaranchal we collected detailed information on different types of forest 
management regimes in the villages surveyed (i.e. 399 forest in 83 villages). We 
were  thus  able  to  study  how  ground-level  measures  of  forest  quality  varied 
across  different  management  regimes.  We  will  report  here  results  for  three 
measures: canopy cover, basal area and lopping (for further details, see Baland 
et al., 2010b). 
  Table  8  reports  the  results  of  the  various  regressions  measuring  the 
impact  of  the  management  regime  on  these  three  measures  of  forest  quality. 
These  regressions,  similar  to  those  of  Somanathan  et  al.  (2009),  use  a  large 
number  of  control  variables  (in  particular,  aspect,  distance  from  the  village  or 
altitude),  as  well  as  village  fixed  effects.  What  we  compare  are  thus  the 
differences observed between forests patches managed by different regimes but 
adjoining the same village.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
                                                 
19 In 2002-3, management costs per hectare were equal to Rs  862 for a State-managed 
forest, as opposed to Rs  65 for a Van Panchayat-managed forest (Somanathan et al. 
2009).    42 
While the results show absence of significant differences between open access 
forests  and  State  forests,  the  forests  managed  by  Van  Panchayats  displayed 
significantly lower rates of lopping. The collection of firewood and leaf-litter for 
fodder is less pronounced when the forest is managed by a Van Panchayat.
20  
  This more rational use of forests mainly typifies the older Van Panchayats 
created before 1980. They are also characterised by a higher biomass, measured 
by canopy cover. On the other hand, the more recently formed Van Panchayats 
have a smaller basal area. This latter result may indicate that Van Panchayats 
tend to form when the concerned forests have a poorer quality to start with.
21 The 
high  performance  of  the  older  Van  Panchayats  possibly  reflects  superior 
management,  being  grounded  in  effective  community  participation.  Reduced 
rates of lopping over long periods of time also are likely to explain why older Van 
Panchayat forests achieve superior biomass than state forest.   
  These findings thus reinforce similar results of Somanathan et al. (2009) 
based on aerial satellite images. Moreover, they indicate a connection between 
measures of biomass in the long run and rates of lopping. It is also consistent 
with the results of Edmonds (2002) for Nepal that creation of an FUG reduces 
household firewood collection. In our study of firewood collection in India (Baland 
et al. 2007a) based on household surveys we also observed a significant decline 
in firewood collection in villages with a larger fraction of neighboring forests under 
Van Panchayat management. These estimates indicate that firewood collection 
                                                 
20 It should also be noted that we did not observe any effect of increased firewood or 
fodder collection in neighbouring forests.  
21 As in Somanathan et al. (2009), everything seems to indicate that the more degraded 
forests are more likely to be converted into a Van Panchayat forest.   43 
levels would decline by an order of 20% if all village forests were converted from 
state into Van Panchayats forests.  
Although setting up a formal community management structure therefore 
appears effective in terms of improving forest quality, it also has important effects 
with respect to redistribution, as it changes the rules for using and sharing forest 
produce. In Nepal, some studies suggest that the local elite often dominate the 
FUG  executive  committee  and  sway  its  decisions  to  their  own  benefit.  More 
particularly, the substantial funds generated by timber sales are invested chiefly 
in projects that are advantageous to this elite.
22 (Banjade et al. 2006; Malla et al. 
2003; Pokharel 2008; Timsina 2003). This is reminiscent of the results obtained 
by Banerjee et al. (2001) in the sugar cooperatives of Maharashtra, in which the 
richest members secure rents for themselves by manipulating producer prices 
and  using  cooperative’s  profits  for  their  personal  benefit  (see  also  Dasgupta 
2010, 2011).  
In the same vein, in a study of some twenty villages in Gujarat, Agarwal 
(2007) shows how the creation of a forest management council (similar to the 
Van  Panchayats)  have  excluded  women—who  are  traditionally  users  of  the 
forest—from participatory and decision-making structures and deprived them of 
their access rights to the forest. The women express their feeling of expropriation 
and exclusion as follows: “If you were to attend meetings, the men will say, oh 
you  haven’t  cooked  my  meal  on  time.  What  happened  to  my  tea?...(…)  The 
meetings  are  considered  for  men  only.  (…)  No  one  ever  listened  to  my 
                                                 
22 Pokharel (2008) estimates that around ¾ of the available funds are allocated to projects 
that benefit wealthier households.    44 
suggestions.  (…)  People  don’t  like  it  when  we  speak,  they  think  women  are 
becoming very smart.”  (Agarwal 2007: 288-9) Agarwal concludes that women 
bear a large share of the costs linked to community forest management, whereas 
they only benefit very indirectly from the related advantages. “How will we cook if 
we don’t get wood from the forest? What do they expect us to do?” (Agarwal 
2007: 291). 
 
4. Summary and Policy Implications 
 
Without  some  kind  of  effective  government  intervention,  the  future  of 
Himalayan forests appear somewhat bleak. Forest degradation in this region is 
related to the unregulated extraction of firewood and fodder, which has led to an 
alarming  decline  in  the  quality  and  resistance  of  trees  in  the  region.  The 
pressures on the Himalayan forests are increasing due to population growth: over 
the last 25 years, the average number of households per village has doubled. In 
addition, the demand for firewood has risen owing to rising standards of living 
and reduced levels of poverty, though this tends to be moderated if growth is 
associated  with  rising  education  and  increasing  incidence  of  non-agricultural 
activities.  
  However, it is unclear that local inhabitants perceive this degradation as 
an important problem, or that they are acting on it to self-regulate local collection 
activities. Local collective action among local inhabitants is conspicuous by its 
absence, in the absence of formal efforts by the state to grant rights to local forest 
user groups. This reason perhaps explains the irrelevance of local land inequality   45 
to  matter  as  a  determinant  of  firewood  collection  levels  (e.g.,  in  Baland  et  al 
2007b), contrary to a large and mainly theoretical literature emphasizing the role 
of collective action. Part of the reason for lack of spontaneous collective action 
may be the negligible magnitude of the associated local externality.  The relevant 
externality is therefore essentially non-local in nature, with forest degradation in 
the Himalayas contributing to landslides, siltation and floods, and possibly also to 
global  climate  change.  These  necessitate  some  kind  of  external  state 
interventions. 
  Two  types  of  policy  interventions  can  be  considered.  The  first  involves 
encouraging  the  development  of  community-based  methods  of  forest 
management.  The  experience  of  Uttaranchal  shows  that  local  community 
management helps ensure a better quality of forest than that obtained through 
the most protected State forests. The measures for setting up these community 
management mechanisms nonetheless have a crucial impact on the extent of 
their success, and it is not clear how state or central governments can encourage 
genuine grass-roots mobilization and involvement in forest management groups. 
Moreover,  it  may  take  a  long  time  for  such  groups  to  become  effective  in 
improving the condition of the forest.  
  The  second  policy  intervention  would  involve  subsidies  on  LPG,  the 
principal form of alternate energy. Our results on household substitution between 
firewood and LPG in response to the price paid for LPG are encouraging in this 
respect,  suggesting  this  to  be  a  cost-effective  and  reliable  method  to  induce 
reduced firewood collections.   46 
  Third, our analysis indicates that the composition of growth matters. To the 
extent  that  growth  is  associated  with  decline  in  traditional  livestock-based 
occupations, and rise of education and non-agricultural occupations, pressures 
on  the  forest  would  be  ameliorated.  Improvements  in  transport  and 
communication would be likely to raise the value of non-agricultural occupations 
and expand accessibility to low cost alternate fuels. Policies encouraging out-
migration  and  reductions  in  fertility  would  also  be  expected  to  reduce  the 
pressure on the forests. 
    
Many important questions need to be addressed in future research. We 
need to re-estimate household demand equations in the Indian context using the 
reduced  form  approach,  and  re-assess  our  findings  concerning  growth 
projections and elasticities with respect to alternate energy costs. The availability 
of  longitudinal  studies  of  forests  and  collection  behaviour  of  neighboring 
communities  would  represent  a  big  step  forward,  in  allowing  for  more  refined 
controls and accurate projections for the future. Our recent exploration ((Baland, 
Libois and Mookherjee 2011) using a small panel from the Nepal LSMS spanning 
1995-96  and  2002-03  generates  results  concerning  the  effects  of  changes  in 
levels and composition of household assets that are similar to those obtained 
from earlier cross-sectional analyses that we have described in this paper. The 
availability of larger and more comprehensive longitudinal surveys would enable 
more  detailed  examination  of  the  inter-connections  between  development  and 
forest degradation. Even using the data in hand, there is scope for assessing 
future  sustainability  of  the  Himalayan  forests  using  simulations  of  a  dynamic   47 
model  of  interaction  between  forest  quality  and  firewood  collection  patterns, 
calibrated to fit the observed patterns in the data.    48 
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